THE IMMORTALITY OF Mans Soule, PROVED BOTH BY SCRIPTVRE *and* REASON.

Contrary to the Fancie of *R. O.* In his Book Intituled *Mans Mortality*; wherein hee (vainely) affirmeth hee hath proved Theologically, and Philosophically, that whole man is a compound wholy mortall, and that the present going of the soule into *Heaven* or *Hell* is a meer fiction, and that at the Resurrection is the beginning of our Immortality, and then actuall *Damnation* or *Salvation*, and not before.

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THE IMMORTALITY OF *MANS SOVLE.*

Proved both by Scripture and Reason.

CHAP. I.

That Man consisteth of two parts, Soule and Body.

Oncerning GOD, we are to acknowledge him to be a *Spirit*, as touching the world, we are to conceive of it as a body, in man we have an abridgment of both, of God in respect of the *Soule*, of the world in composition of the Body, as though the Creator on purpose to set forth a mirror of all his workes, intended to bring into one little compasse, both the infinitnesse of his owne nature; and also the hugenesse of the whole world together, after his own Image in respect of his soule, after his other creatures in respect of life, sence and moving, mortall so farre as he holdeth forth the Image of the creature, immortall so farre as hee holdeth forth the Image of GOD his Creator.

Arg. 1. This may be proved by pregnant arguments.

1 No creature can worke out of his owne propet ſpheare, how can man if totally mortal conceive of immortality, can mortality comprehend immortality? as probably as a man may throw a ſtone and knock downe the ſunne which is farre above his ſpheare. The beaſts mind altogether the earth they eate when they are hungry drinke when they are dry and go when they are beaten and regard their Creator no more then they doe the clock when it ſtrikes. The fiſh live in the water as the beaſts upon the earth becauſe they are aqueall the other terrene, neither rationall and therefore cannot worke above their ſphear, but man conceives not only the things of this world, but alſo of a better, immortality, glory eternity, therfore muſt needs have ſomething in him that is immortal. Who is hee that deſireth not to be immortal? how can he deſire it unleſſe he know what it is? how can he know what it is unleſſe he have ſomthing in him immortal? none of us coveteth to be beginningleſſe, beauſe none of us are ſo, neither can be ſo and becauſe we are not ſo, we can not comprehend what it is, for who can conceive of eternity without beginning, but he will end his Wits before his deſires? but on the contrary there is not ſo baſe a mind upon earth which coveteth not to live for ever, in ſo much that whereas we looke not for it by natur we ſeeke to obtayne it by ſkill and pollicy, ſome by bookes, ſome by images, and ſome by other devices, and even the ignoranteſt ſort of people can well imagine in themſelves what immortality is, and are able both to conceive it and beleeve it; but the wiſeſt and

and learnedeſt man alive, ſhould he live as long as *Mathuſalah*, and ſtudie what it is to be with out beginning all his life time, he muſt at laſt yeild to death without fulfilling or filling full his deſires; whence comes this? but that our *ſoules* being created, cannot conceive an everlaſtingneſſe without beginning yet being created immortal can well conceive an everlaſtingneſſe or immortality without end.

Let us yet wade a little deeper, who can diſpute, or once ſo much as doubt whether the *ſoule* be Immortal or no, but he that is capable of Immortality? or who can underſtand a difference betweene mortal and immortal but he that is immortal? can a *horſe, an ox, a dogge? no, why? becauſe thy are mortall, and can reach no higher than mortality Immortality is out of their Sphear, out of their Element, as the Proverbe is, Man is able to conceive what is reaſon, and what is not; and by that wee terme him rationall, Man knows a difference betwixt Mortality, and Immortality; and therefore muſt needs be immortall: for to what end ſhould God teach Immortality to a mortall wight.

Though they ſhall riſe again as well as man, ſaith *R. O.* treat of Mortality. pag. 50.

If a man ſhould hold an argument, that man is not rationall, and diſpute it, hee needs other confutation then his owne arguments: ſo hee that diſputes that the ſoule is mortall, his owne reaſoning of it, ſhall to a wiſe man prove it immortall.

Secondly, it is plainly proved, that man conſiſts of two parts, Soule and Body; becauſe they performe ſeverall and different works at one and the ſame time. The ſoule or mind of man will be at *Conſtantinople*, then at *Rome*, at *Paris*, at *Lyons*, in *America*, *Ag.* 2.

in *Affrick*, and diſpatch all theſe journies in a trice, looke whereſoever thou directeſt it, there it is, and before thou calleſt it back, it is at home, while the body al this time is at home at worke, or perhaps in bed; therefore the ſoule and body are two different parts: nay, the ſoule may, and often doth mind and deſire good, when the body is acting ſinne, *Rom.*7.23.24,25 *I find a law in my members warring againſt the law of my mind* (or ſoule) *and bringing mee into captivity, to the law of my members*, but was it his body that warred againſt his mind, and brought it into captivity? reade the next verſe, you ſhall ſee, *O wretched man that I am who ſhall deliver me from the body of this death?* or this body of death, as the margin more truly hath it, this mortall body. So then (ſaith he) with my mind I will ſerve the Lord, but with my fleſh the law of ſin: thus it plainely appears, the ſoule and body are two different parts.

*Arg.*3. Thirdly, that the ſoule is not the body, nor any part of it, but ſoule and body two very different things, appears of it ſelfe without further proofe, for if the ſoule were the body, or any part of the body, it would, nay muſt needs grow with the body, and decline with the body, it would be maimed with the body, and ſick with the body, for elſe how can it dye with the body, but daily experience proves the contrary, for were ſoule the ſame with, or part of the body, the greater the body were, the greater would the ſoule be: but the contrary appears, thoſe that are ſtrongeſt in mind, are commonly weakeſt in body, and the ſoule is ſeene to be full of livelineſſe in a languiſhing body, and to grow the more in force by the decay

decay of the body, by growing of the soule I meane, (mistake me not) not that it increaseth or diminisheth, it is capable of neither, but its profiting in power and vertue; againe, if the soule were the body or any part of it, it would languish with the body: hee that is wounded in his body, would be wounded in his understanding, as well as in his members: he that is sicke of any disease, should also be sicke in his reason: he that limpeth or halteth, should halt in his reason also; the blind mans soule should be blind, and the lame mans lame; but the contrary appeares, the maimed, the sicke, the cripples, the blind, have their understanding cleere sighted, their reason sound, their discourse vigorous, and their soule safe and sound; on the other side, many a man dieth, whose body is sound, and differeth not a whit in any part, from what it was when he was living, anatomize him, the quickest eyed Chyrurgian shal see, nor perceive no cause of his death, outward nor inward, nor failing of any particular, to cause it, and yet life, motion, sence, and understanding, are out of it, we may say then (if wee are not wilfully blind, for none so blind as he that will not see) that there was something in the body, that was not of the body, that was a farre other thing then the body.

Object. But some say, that the force and strength of the soule, groweth with the body, & Children have none, and Drunkards have soules by jumps, and many other crotchets, as vaine as ridiculous.

I answer, it cannot be said, that a Childs soule groweth, or is strengthned by time, but rather his nerves, or sinewes are hardned and strengthned, which the soule useth

R. O. treat of Mortality, p. 19. where hee pleaseth himselfe with the merry conceits of his own fancy, which hee doth in many other places of that treat.

useth as strings and instruments to move withall, or or act by; and therefore when age weakneth them, a man useth a staffe to helpe them with, though he have as good a will to run, as he had when he was young, you may often heare a decrepid old man boast and talke of the valorous acts of his youth, he desires to be doing the same then, *for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh*: The soule then which moveth all at one beck, hath the selfe-same power in infancy, that it hath in age, and the same in old age, that it hath in the flower of youth, the fault is only in the instrument, which is unable to execute the operation thereof, the skilfulnesse of a Musician is not diminished by the slackenesse, hardnesse, or moystnesse of his Lute-strings, nor increased by the goodnesse, curious setting or straining of them, only in the one he cannot shew his cunning, in the other he may shew it more or lesse.

Likewise, the speech of Children commeth with their teeth, howbeit the speech doth manifestly utter it selfe first, in that they prattle many things, which they cannot pronounce, and in old men it goeth again with their teeth, and yet their eloquence is not abated thereby, as in *Demosthenes*, though he surmounted all the Orators of his time, yet there was some Letters he could not pronounce, give unto old age, or infancie the same sinewes and teeth, and as lusty and able limbs, and members as youth hath, and the actions which the soule doth with the body, and by the body, (I mean so farre forth as concerne the abilities of sense and livelinesse) shall be performed, as well in one age, as in another: Be but as impartiall in judging of the force and power of thy owne soule, as of the skilfulnesse

neſſe of a Lute-player, (I ſay not by the nimbleneſſe of his fingers, which may perchance be knorted with the Gout, but by the ſweetneſſe of his Harmony, which plainly ſheweth, that hee hath cunning in his head, though hee can ſhew it no more with his hands) ſo as thou wouldſt conſider how thou haſt in thy ſelfe a deſire to goe, though thy feet are not able to beare thee, a diſcretion to judge of things that are ſpoken, though thine eares cannot convey it to thee, a ſound eloquence though for want of teeth (or any other impediment) thou art not able to expreſſe it; and which is above all, a ſubſtantiall, quick and heavenly reaſon, even when thy body is moſt debile, infirme, weake, crazie, earthly, ſick and drooping: Thou wouldſt ſoone conclude, that the force and power, of quickning, moving, and perceiving, is whole and ſound in thy ſoule, and that the default is only, and altogether in thy body: in ſo much, that if thy ſoule had a new body, and new inſtruments given to her, it would be as luſty, and as cheerfull as ever it was, and the more it perceiveth the body to decay, the more it retireth, or laboureth to retire to it ſelfe, the more active the thoughts are of another being, of a better being, of an eternall being; which is a plaine proofe that it is not the body, nor any part of the body, but the very life, and inworker of the body.

Fourthly, unleſſe man have in him a ſoul (or ſomething elſe) that is immortall, there can be no reſurrection: This I ſhall prove by ſolid reaſon, though *R. O.* hale in the contrary, to make up the number of his abſurdities: for if the ſoule dye with the body, or if there be no ſoule at all, and man all body, and ſo reduced *Arg. 4.*

duced to the *prima materia*, how can there be a reſurrection? there may be a new Creation, if you pleaſe, the firſt was a Creation, the matter is the very ſame, that it was before the Creation: *Ergo*, the worke the very ſame, *viz.* a new Creation, ſee it by the example of the Creation of the world, a fit paralel for *R.O.2 Pet.3. 10. The day of the Lord will come as a Theife in the night, in which the Heavens ſhal paſſe away with a great noyſe, and the Elements ſhall melt with fervent heat, the earth alſo, and the works that are therein ſhall be burnt up, and* verſ.13. *nevertheleſſe we according to his promiſe looke for a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth Righteouſneſſe.* What? will God raiſe up the Heaven and Earth, Sun, Moone, and Stars againe out of the *Chaos?* will he make a Reſurrection of the world? no, no, man, they are brought, to the *prima materia*, this is worke for a Creation, not a Reſurrection, *Eſay 65.17. Behold, I create new Heavens, and a new Earth, &c.*

See it by the Apoſtle *Pauls* owne Compariſon, *1 Cor.* 15.36, 37. *Thou foole that which thou ſoweſt is not quickned, except it dye, and that which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that body which ſhal be, but bare grain, &c.* If this graine have not in it a vitall ſpirit, a growing a ſpirit, a reſuſcitative ſpirit, a ſpirit of life, it cannot grow, it is true, the terrene part of it dies, but the vitall part lives, and give a Reſurrection (if I may ſo call it) to another Plant of the ſame kind: Take an Oake Tree that is dead and rotten, ſet in the ground, it will not grow while the world ſtands. Take an Acorne, ſet that in the ground, it will grow: why will that, and not the other? becauſe there is ſpirit in that which dies not, but cauſeth life to the terrene part of it, which dies,

and

and consumes; vvhereas the other hath none. So if man have no immortall spirit in him, here is no place for a Resurrection, it must be an absolute Creation (if any thing) that gives him life againe, but the whole current of Scripture, hold forth a Resurrection and therfore man hath something in him immortall.

In the fift place I might prove that man hath an immortall spirit, uncapable of death, by the testimony of the ancient Heathen, far ancienter (many of them) then *Plato*, which also is a rationall proofe of a point; for what the God of nature hath taught to all men by nature, is, and must needs be a truth.

But the God of nature hath taught all men by nature, that there is a God, that they have an immortall spirit, therefore it is a truth.

I doe not say he hath taught it some one man, or some one nation, but the whole world, the Vniversality of it shewes it to be of God: The Divel teacheth not all nations, one and the same particular sinne, but different according to the constitution of the climate they live in, else he would loose his labour, and that he knows well enough, he hath taught it by nature: for those nations that never heard what grace was, hold and confesse, and leave to posterity this truth: all men universally, and particularly have learned it in one Schoole from the mouth of one Teacher, and he perfect, therefore a truth.

The holy Scripture which teacheth us our salvation, useth no Schoole-arguments to make us beleeve there is a God, and why so? because we find him present in his works, neither to prove this point, which shines so cleere in natnre.

Both Greeke and Latine Authors have plentifully left it to posterity.

Phocylides. Ψυχὴ δ' ἀθανάτος καὶ ἀγήρως ζῇ διὰ παντὸς.

The soule is immortall, and liveth perpetually; and never waxeth old. And againe,

Δείφανα ἀπειχόμθ'ων. ὀπίσω θεοὶ τιλέθοντα.
Ψυχαὶ γὰρ μίμνουσιν ἀκήραιον ἐνδιμθύουσαν.

The remainder of dead men, remaines void of death.

If you aske him the cause of this, hee will answer you in another verse, thus (for he was a rationall man)

Πνεῦμα γὰρ ἐσὶ θεοῦ χρῆσις θνητοῖσι καὶ εἰκών.

Sybilla. The soule is Gods Instrument, and Image in mortall men. Hitherto comes that of the Sybill.

Εἰκὼν ἐσὶν ἀνθρώπου ἐμὴ λόγον ὄρθον ἔχουσα.

Man by all reason is indued with the Image of God; of the same opinion also were *Orpheus*, *Theognis*.

Piadar. in the second song of his Olympiads. *Homer* in the funerals of his Iliads *Herm.* in his Pœnander. pag. 10. *Homer*, *Hesiod*, *Pindarus*, and all the Poets of old time, which may answer for themselves, and their Countries, and for the residue of their ages.

Hermes saith, the soul is the garment of the mind, and the garment of the soul, is a certaine spirit wherby it is united to the body, and this mind is that which wee call properly the man, that is, a heavenly wight, not to be compared to the beasts, but rather to the gods of heaven, if it be not yet more then they, the heavenly cannot come downe to the earth without leaving the heaven, but man measureth the heaven without removng from the earth: to be short, his conclusion is that man is double, mortall as touching his body, immortall as touching his soul, which soul is the very man, and created of God (saith he) as the light is bred immediatly of the sunne.

And

And *Chalcidius* saith, that at his death he spake these words, I goe home againe into mine own country where my better Forefathers and kindred be.

Zoroastres, who is of more antiqnity then *Hermes*, this article is reported to be one of his, that mens souls are immortall, and that one day, there shall be a generall rising againe of their bodies, and the answer of the wise men of Chaldea (Who were the heires of his doctrine) doe answer sufficiently for him.

There is one that exhorteth men to returne with speed to their heavenly father: Who hath sent them a soul indued with much understanding.

Another exhorteth them to seeke Paradice, as the peculiar dwelling place of the soule.

A third saith, that the soule hath God as it were shut up in it, and that it hath not any mortality therin, for (saith he) the soule is as it were drunken with God, and sheweth forth his wonders in the harmony of this mortall body.

A fourth saith it is a cleare fire proceeding from the power of the heavenly father, an incorruptible substance, and the maintainer of life, containing almost all the whole world with the full plenty therof in his bosome.

But one of them proceedeth yet further, affirming that he that setteth his mind upon Godlines, shall save even his body, though it be never so fraile: and by those words hee acknowledgeth the very glorifying of the body.

All these are reported by *Psellus*, and he confesseth that *Plato* and *Pythagoras* learned the doctrine of the souls Immortality of the Caldeans, in so much

that some thinke the Caldeans are those that *Plato* speakes of, when hee saith, that the ancient and holy Oracles are to be beleeued, which affirme mens soules to be immortall, and that in another life, they must come before a Iudg that wil require an account of all their doings, the result whereof commeth to this, that the soule of man proceedeth immediatly from God, that is to say, that the father of the body is one, and the father of the soule is another; that the soule is not a bodily substance, but a spirit and a light, that at the departure therof from hence, it is to goe to a Paradice, & therfore ought to make haste unto death and that it is so far from mortality, that it maketh even the body Immortall: what can wee say more at this day, even in the time of light wherin we live of the same opinion was *Heraclitus*, as is reported by *Philolaus*.

Lil. Legum 11. *ep.* 2.

Of *Epicharmus* we have this saying, if thou beest a good man in thy heart, death can doe thee noe harme, for thy soul shall live happily in heaven:

Clement. of Alexandria.

It were endlesse to recite al the words of the ancient about this subject, confirming this trueth, for of this opinion were *Thales*, *Anaxagoras*, *Diogenes*, and *Zeno*, *Lucretius*, *Socrates*, *Xenophon*, read *Plato* his *Timæus*, his commonwealth, his Phadon, his Politicks, his laws, *Aristotle* his books of living things, of the soul his morralls, *Michael* of Ephesus upon his morrals, *Cicero* his Tuscu'aves, his Comforts, his nature of the gods; his first booke of lawes, his *Scipios* dreame, *Seneca* to *Gallio*, to *Lucillius*, concerning the Lady *Martiaes* son, the shortnes of his life, his book of comforts, *Prophririus* 4. booke of abstinence, *Plutarke*, these ancient.

For moderne Philosophers, *Epictetus*, *Simplicius*, Plo-

Plotinus, lib. 1. *Aenead.* 4. concerning the being of the ſoule *lib.* 2. *Chapter* 1. *lib.* 3. *Chapter* 18. 14.20.21.23. *lib.* 4. *Chapter* 11. and the 7. Book throughout, his book of the ſenſes & memory, his Bk. of doubts concerning the ſoule, theſe and thouſands more confirme the point though they differ in circumſtance, that man conſiſts of two parts, viz. a body and a reaſonable and immortall ſoule, and where they had this notion I ſhewed before

CHAP. 9.

Of the Abilities; Or Faculties of the Soule,

IN the inward man, wee have a ſumme of whatſoever life, ſence, moving, is in all creatures and moreover a ſhadow of the godhead it ſelfe, and that is the thing we have to examine in this Chapter.

In plants we perceive that beſides the bodies which we ſee, there is alſo an inward vertue which we ſee not, wherby they live, grow, bud, and beare fruit, which we call the quickening vertue and it maketh them to differ from ſtones, and mettalls, which have it not.

In ſenſitive things, we find the very ſame vertue, which worketh while they ſleepe, and are after a ſort as plants, and there withall we find a nother ſort of vertue or power, which ſeeth, heareth, ſmelleth, taſteth and feelleth, which alſo in many of them doeth hord up the things brought in by the ſences, which manner of power the plants are voyd of; this we call the ſenſitive vertue, becauſe the effects there of are diſcerned and executed by the ſences.

In man we have both the quickening and ſenſitive the

the former uttering it selfe in the nourishing and increasing of him. and the latter in the subtilty of sence, and imagination, through which hee hath both quickning and sensitive life to gether: but moreover he hath a mind, which reapeth profit by the things brought in by the senses, which by his seeing conceives the things it seeth not; which of that which is not, gathereth that which is, which elevateth the thoughts from the earth and earthly things, yea, and after a sort from himselfe too, this we call the resonable soule, and it is the thing that maketh man to be man, and not a plant or a bruit beast as the other two doe.

But by the way, wheras I say, that the inward man hath a quickening power as a plant hath, a sensitve power as a beast hath, and a powe of understanding wherby he is man, my meaning is not that he hath three soules but only one soule, that like as in a bruit beast the sensitive soule comprehends the quickening soul; so in man the reasonable soule comprehends both sensitive, and quickening, and excecuteth the offices of them all three, all at one and the same time, it both heareth, seeth, smelleth, reasoneth, at one & the same time: the mind of a man wil intend his own housholds affairs, the affairs of the common-wealth, & heavenly things all at once.

Or to speake more fitly, these three degrees are three degrees of life, whereof the second exceedeth and containeth the first, the third exceedeth and containeth both the other two, the one, without which the body cannot live, is the vegetable, and is so tied to the body that it sheweth not it selfe in any wise out of it, the second which cannot live without the body is the life of a beast, a sensitive life, which doeth well ma-

manifeſt its power abroad, but yet not otherwiſe, bnt by the members and inſtruments of the body, wherto it is tyed, the third which can of it ſelfe live without the body, but not the boby without it, is the rationall ſoule of man, which giveth life inwardly to all his parts, and deliniaments, ſheweth forth his life abroad in perceiving all things, ſubject to ſence, and retaineth ſtill his force (as we ſhewed before) yea and increaſeth it, even when the ſtrength of the body: yea & the very livelyneſſe therof doth faile, you ſhall ſee a man forgoe all his ſences one after another, as the inſtruments of them decay, & yet ſtill have life untovched and reaſon qvick, the reaſon is, the inſtruments of life fail, but life it ſelf which quickens them fails not, wherby its aparent that in this ſoul of man (which notwithſtanding is but one) there are diverſities of power, abilityes and faculties, the quickening power, doth nouriſh, increaſe, and maintain us, & reaſon nor ſence meddle not with it, neither have they power to impeach the working therof: the truth of this appeares, in that theſe things are beſt done when our mind is at reſt, and our ſences aſleep, in ſo much that oftentimes we forgoe the ſence and moving of ſome parts, by ſome rhume, or ſome palſy, and yet ſome parts ceaſe not to be nouriſhed ſtill, alſo the ſenſitive life ſeeth and perceiveth a far off, yea oft times without ſetting the mind therupon, or without conſidering what the ſence conceiveth, ſome men which have but weake ſences, have very quick underſtandings, & on the contrary, againe ſome fall into a conſumption, which want not the parfect uſe of their ſences, ſometimes the reaſonable part is ſo bent and occupied, about the things that it liketh of, that by the increaſing of it ſelfe, it hurteth and dimi-

ni-

nisheth, the part of it quickneth: Also it standeth in argument against the sences, & reproveth them of falshood, & concludeth contrary to their information, & it may be the man that hath his digestion good, and his sences sound, not his wit and reason, sound in like Case, now were the soule but only one faculty it could not be, so but now it is divided manifestly into wit, or understanding, and will, the one serving to device, the other to execute, for we understand many things which we will not, & we will divers things which we understand not, which contrary operations, cannot bee atributed to one power, nevertheless the uniting of these powers is with that distinckness, and the distinguishing of them with that union, that ordinarily they meet altogether in one and the same action, the one of them (in all liklyhood) as readily as the other, howbeit every one of them doth his owne proper worke severally by himselfe, and one before another in respect of their objects.

Chap. 3.

Of the Essence of the Soule.

It is not enough to know wee have a soule, say some, whereby we live, feele, and understand, &c. and which being but one, hath in it selfe alone, so many powers, faculties, and abilities, but it will be demanded, what this soule is: and truly, if I should say I cannot tell what it is, I should not bely my selfe, I should but confesse mine own ignorance, as many learned men have done before me, and I should doe no wrong at all to the soule it selfe, sith we cannot deny the effects of it; and truly, in my opinion, the lesse we are able to define the nature, and being thereof, the more doth the Excellency thereof shine forth, and

and appeare, the dulneſſe of the underſtanding is ſuch by the fall of man in *Adam*, that it cannot conceive of the nature of ſpirits affirmatively, but by the effects, or negatively, and thoſe that went about to define it, ran into many errours and abſurdities; yet it follows not, that man hath no ſoule, were it not a worthy and learned Argument, for a man to reaſon thus: I know not what the ſoul is, therfore there is none, or the learned differ in the definition of it; therefore there is none: its juſt, as if a man ſhould ſay, I know not where the Indies are, therefore there are none; ſince it is ſo then, it needs no long ſcanning, whether it be a ſubſtance or a quality; for qualities have no being but in another thing then themſelves; the ſoule which cauſeth another thing to be, cannot be a quality; for as much as the ſoule maketh man to be man, who otherwiſe were but a carkeis, or carrion; therefore we muſt needs grant, that the ſoule is a forming ſubſtance, and ſubſtantiall forme; yea, and a moſt excellent ſubſtance, infinitly paſſing the outward man, which by the power and vertue thereof, cauſeth another thing to have being, and perfecteth the bodily ſubſtance, which ſeemeth inwardly to have ſo many perfections.

1 Soule not a quality but a ſubſtance.

Secondly, as the ſoule is a ſubſtance, not a quality, ſo it is a ſubſtance unbodily, incorporiall. 1. If we conſider the nature of a body, it hath certaine dementions and comprehendeth not any thing, that is not proportioned to the greatneſſe and capacitie of it, for as it ſelfe muſt have place in another thing ſo muſt other things occupy ſome certaine place in it; by reaſon whereof it commeth to paſſe, that things can have no place ther-

2 Vnbodil. 1

in, if they be greater then it, without annoying one another, to be ſhort if the thing be leſſe then the body that containes it, the whole body ſhall not containe it, but ſome part of it only, and if it be greater, ſome part muſt needs be out, for there is no meaſuring of bodies but by quantity, but we ſee our ſoule comprehends heaven and earth, without annoying either other, and alſo time paſt, preſent and to come, without troubling one another: and alſo innumerable places, perſons and townes, without cumbering our underſtanding, great things are there in their full bigneſſe, and ſmall things in their vtmoſt ſmalneſſe, both of them whole and ſound, in the ſoule whole and ſound, and not by peice-meale, or only in part of it: Moreover the fuller it is, the more it is able to receive; the more things are couched in it, the more it ſtil coveteth, and the greater the things be, the fitter is it to receive it, even when they be at the greateſt. It followeth therfore, that the ſoule (which after a ſort is infinit) cannot be a body, and ſo much the leſſe can it be ſo, for that, wheras it harboureth ſo many and ſo great things in it, it ſelfe is lodged in ſo ſmall a body.

2 Secondly, a body cannot be in divers places at once, nor cannot paſſe without removing, but the ſoule as a thouſand places may be in it, without occupying any places, ſo is the mind in a thouſand places without changing place, & that not by ſucceſſion of times, nor by turnes, but often times altogether at one inſtant, as we ſhewed in the firſt chapter, now there is not a body, that is or can be ubiquitary, or in diverſe places at once, it is againſt the nature of a body, all bodily motion requires time, yea & ſuch time, as within a little over or under is proportioned both to its place, and to the

the length of its way it hath to go, then it is certain that our soul is not a bodily substance, which thing appeareth so much the more plainely, that it being lodged within this body, which is so movable, it removeth not with the body.

3 Also it is a sure ground, that two bodies cannot mutually enter either into other, or contain either other, but the greater must needs alway contain, and the other lesser must needs be contained, but by our soules we enter not only into other bodies, but also either into other minds, so as we comprehend either other, by mutuall understãding, & imbrace either other, by mutual love, it follows then that this substãce, which is able to receive, a bodiles thing can be no body, & so much the rather, because the body that seemeth to hold it containeth it not 3

Fourth. That the soul is no bodily substance is manifest, in that it maketh al things that it lodgeth in it after a sort spirituall, therfore it self must needs be a spirituall substance, because it bereaves the thing it contains, after a sort of its body, & makes it spiritual, if ther were any bodilines in it, it were unable to enter into the knowledg of a body, a thousand severall shapes are seen in a glass, if the clear of the glas had any peculiar shape of its own, none of those shapes could be seen but only its own, also all visible things are imprinted in the eye, if the sight of the eye had any peculiar colour of its own, either it would not see at all, or all things would seem like to that colour, which is in the eye; likewise the tongue is the discerner of al tasts, if it be not clear, but encumbred with humors, all things will be of the tast of the humor that the tongue is incumbred with, if it be bitter, they also are bitter, if watrish, they are watrish, yea if it be bitter, it cãnot judg of bitternes it self, that a thing may receive al shapes al colours, & all tasts 4

it is requisite that it be cleare of all shape, of all colour, of all savour of its owne, and that a thing may in understanding, know and conceive all bodies, as our soule doeth, it is requisite that it be altogether bodilesse it selfe, for had it any bodilinesse in it, it could not receive any body into it, without marring or altering it selfe or the other, for if you look nearly into the nature of a body, you shall find that no body receiveth into it the substantiall forme of a nother body without altering or loosing its owne, or the other, neither can passe from one form to another, without marring the first, as is plainely to be seene in wood, when it receiveth fire, in seeds, when they spring forth into buds, and so in other things, what is to be said, then of mans soule which receiveth & conceiveth the formes and shapes of all things, with out corrupting its own, and morover becommeth the perfecter by the more receiving, for the more it receiveth, the more it understandeth, and the more it understandeth, the more perfect it is.

Fiftly, if it be a bodily substance, from whence is it, or of what mixture is it; if of any, then of the Elements, if of the Elements, how can that give life, which hath none in it selfe; how can that give understanding, that hath no sence; that divers things that have no being of themselves, should give being to another, or be made a thing that hath a being? that of divers out-sides should bee made one body, or of diverse bodies, one soule; or of diverse darknesses one light, of divers deaths one life; surely this one absurdity is able to countervail and out-weigh all those 69. in *R. O.* his treaties of mans Mortality, by this it plainly appears,

appears, that hee which made the mixture of theſe bodies, hath for the perfecting our body (beyond nature) breathed a ſoul into it, to be ſhort, the property of a body is to ſuffer, the property of a ſoule is to doe, & if the body be not put forth, by ſome other thing then it ſelfe, it is a very blocke, whereas the ſoul which is in our body, ceaſeth not to ſtirre up & down, though it have nothing to move it from without, therefore it is to be concluded fom theſe reaſons (and the like that might be alleaged) that the ſoule is a ſubſtance incorporeall, unbodily, notwithſtanding it be united to our bodies.

Thirdly, as our ſoule, is a ſubſtance unbodily, ſo is it unmateriall, likewiſe, & that appeareth, firſt becauſe matter receiveth not any forme or ſhape, but according to his owne quantity, and but only one forme at once, whereas our ſoule receiveth all formes without quantity, come there never ſo many at once, or never ſo greate. 3 Immateriall. 1

Secondly, no matter receiveth contrary formes at once, but our ſoule comprehendeth and receiveth them together, as fire and water, heat & cold, white and blacke, and not only together, but alſo better by laying and matching of them together.

Laſtly, to be ſhort, it appeares, that the ſoule is not materiall, ſeeing the more we depart from matter, the more we underſtand, ſurely there is nothing more contrary to the ſubſtance of the ſoule then the nature of matter, then is this reaſonable ſoule of ours neither a bodily nor a materiall thing, nor depending upon matter in the beſt action thereof, then muſt needs be of it ſelfe, and not proceed from body, or mat-

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ter, for what can a body bring forth but a body, & matter but matter, and materialls but materialls; and therfore the ſoule is an unmateriall ſubſtance, which hath being of it ſelfe.

4 Imomrtall and incorruptible. *Plutarke, de ſera uuminis vindicta tractat.*

Fourthly, the ſoule as it is a ſubſtance, incorporeall, immateriall, ſo is it incorruptible, and immortall, *Plutarke* ſaith, it is in vaine to diſpute thereof: for ſaith he, the doctrine of Gods providence & that of the immortallity of the ſoule are ſo knocked together, that take away the one the other follows, (God grant that experience prove not *Plutarkes* words true, in ſome now living) for, ſaith he, to what purpoſe was the world created, if there were no body to behold it? or to what end, behold we the creatures in the world but to ſerve him? and why ſhould wee ſerve upon no hope? and to what end hath he endewed us with theſe rare gifts of his, which for the moſt part doe but put us to paine and trouble in this life, if we periſh like the bruit beaſts, which know not God.

But becauſe all are not of *Plutarkes* mind, wee will ſee if we can ſatisfie the contrary minded, by reaſon, for the better ſatiſfying of thoſe who take not ſo much paines as to enter into themſelves, I ſhall indeavour to paint out to them, their right ſhapes, by lively reaſon, which they have defaced by ignorance, and therefor now to the purpoſe.

1 Firſt I ſhewed before, that the ſoule is not a body, neither increaſeth nor decreaſeth with the body, but contrary wiſe, the more the body decreaſeth; the more the underſtanding increaſeth, the neerer the body draweth to death the more freely doth the mind underſtand, the more the body abateth the more power-

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full is the mind, why then should we thinke that the thing which becommeth the stronger, by the weakneſſe of the body, & which is advanced by the decay of the body, should periſh to duſt with the body? a mans seeing fails, because his eyes faile, but the blind mans understanding encreaseth, because his eyes are not buſied, and the old mans reason becommeth more perfect, by the loſſe of his sight, & therefore why say we not, that the body failleth the soule, but the soule faileth not the body, that the glaſſes are out of the ſpectacles, but the eyes good still.

But, saith *R.O.* the part or member is endowed with the faculty, & so seeing is in the eye naturally, & really, and not the soule sees by the eye, and hearing locally in the eare, and so common sence, judgment & memory locally adherent to, and inherent in their places, & hee proveth it, with this frigid argument: becauſe if the member be periſhed the sence falles. *Obiect.* 1. Mans mortality pag. 13.

To which I answer, if the ey be the thing that seeth, and the eare the thing that heareth, why doe we not see things double, and heare sounds double, seeing wee have two eys & two ears, it is the soul then that seeth & heareth, and theſe which hee taketh to be our sences are but the inſtruments of our sences, for when our eys are shut or pickt out, we then behold a thousand things in our mind, yea and then our understanding is moſt quick sighted, when the quickeſt of our eye-sight, is as good as quenched, or quite dead how is it poſſible that the reaſonable soule should be tied to the sences? what a worthy reason is it to say the soule dyeth with the sence, seeing the true sences, do grow & increaſ, even then when the inſtruments of the sences doe die. *Answ.*

Alſo

Also I pproved before, that the soule is not the body, nor any part of the body, seeing then it is so, why measure we that by the body, which measureth al bodies, or make that to dye with the body, wherby the bodies that died many hundred yeares agoe, do after a certaine manner live still, or who can hurt that thing, whom nothing hurteth or hindreth in that body? though a man loose an arme, yet doth his soule remaine whole stil, let a man forgoe the one halfe of his body, yet is his soule as sound as before, for it is united in its owne substance, & by the force and power of its selfe, it sheddeth it self into all parts of the body, though the body rot away by peice meale, yet abideth the soule whole & undiminished, let the blood drain out, the moving wax weake, the strength perish, yet abideth the mind sound, & lively, it never forsakes its lodging, till there be no roome left for it to lodge in, when our fences are overcome by death, then it doth most labour to surmount it selfe, working as goodly & Godly actions at that time when the body is at poynt to faile it, yea and oftentimes more godly too, then ever it did while the body was in health, as for example, it taketh order for it selfe, for our household, for the common wealth, for a whole kingdome, & that with more uprightnesse, goodnesse, wisedome and modration, then ever it did before, yea and perchance in a body so far spent, so bare, so consumed, so withered without, and so putrified within, that he that lookes upon him sees nothing but earth, and yet to hear him speake would ravish a man up to heaven, now when a man sees so lively a soule in so weake and wretched a body, may he not from reason conclude, as is said in hatching of chickens, the shell is broken, but there commeth forth a chicken.

Secondly

Secondly, for proofe that the ſoule is immortall, ſee what is the ordinary cauſe that things periſh; fire either goeth out for want of nouriſhment, or is quenched by his contrary water: water is reſolved into ayre by fire, which is his contrary: the cauſe why the Plant dieth, is extremity of cold, or drought, or unſeaſonable cutting, or violent plucking up; alſo mans body dieth by encreaſing, or diminiſhing the humors called complection, or by violence; of all theſe cauſes which can wee chuſe to have any power againſt our ſoule? I ſay againſt the ſoule of man, which (notwithſtanding it be united to matter to a body) is it ſelfe a ſubſtance unbodily, unmateriall, and only conceivable in underſtanding; nay, what can be contrary to that which lodgeth contraries equally in it ſelfe? which underſtandeth the one of them by the other, which coucheth them all under one skill; and to be ſhort, in which the contrarieties themſelves abandon their contrariety; ſo as they doe not purſue, but enſue one another.

Fire is hot, and water is cold, our bodies miſlike theſe contraries, and are grieved by them, our mind linketh them together, without either burning or cooling it ſelfe, and it ſetteth the one of them againſt the other to know them the better, the things which deſtroy one another throughout the world, maintaine one another in our minds, nothing is more contrary to peace then warre; and yet mans mind can maintaine peace by preparing for warre, and lay earneſtly for war in ſeeking for peace; even death it ſelfe which diſpatcheth our life cannot be contrary to the life of the ſoule; for the ſoule ſeeketh life by death; what

Contrarieties cannot kil the ſoule.

can the soule meet withall, in the whole world that can be contrary to it? which can enjoyne obedience to things most contrary; contrarieties then cannot do it.

Nor want of food.

What then, can want of food? How can that want food in the world, which can feed on the whole world, or how can that forsake food, which the fuller it is, the hungrier it is; the more that it hath digested, the better able it is to digest; the more it hath, the more it desireth; take from it the sensible things, and the things of understanding abide with it still; bereave it of earthly things, and the heavenly remaine with it the more abundantly: to be short, abridge it of al worldly things; yea, and of the world it selfe, and even then doth it feed with greatest ease, and maketh cheer agreeable to its owne nature.

Also, the body filleth it selfe to a certaine measure, and delighteth in some certaine things; but what can fill the mind? fill it as full as you can with the knowledge of things, and it is the more eager, and sharper set to receive more; the more it taketh in, the more it still craveth; and yet for all that it never feeleth any rawnesse, it never catcheth a surfit for want of concoction; what shall I say more, discharge your understanding from minding it selfe, and then doth it live in him, and of him, in whom all things doe live; againe, fill it with the knowledge of it selfe, and then doth it feele it selfe most empty, and sharpest set upon the desire of the other; now then can that die for want of food, which cannot bee glutted with any thing, which is nourished and maintained with all things; and which (in very deed) liveth upon him,

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by whom all the things which we wonder at here beneath are upheld.

Nor violence.

Well, violence (you will say) perhaps may doe the deed; what is violence, but a justling of two bodies together, but the soul is no body, nor bodily substance, as I proved before, can there be any violence between a bodily, and spirituall substance, or betweene two spirituall substances; seeing that oftentimes when they would destroy one another, they uphold one another; and if the soule cannot be pushed at; neither inwardly, nor outwardly; is there any thing in nature, that can naturally hurt it?

Object.

No! will some say? wee see it weakned by an incounter, as we may discerne by the senses; the more excellent the thing is, which the sence receiveth; so much the more the sense it selfe offended, and grieved therewith: As for example, the feeling by fire, the taste by harshnesse, the smelling by strong savour, the hearing by the hideousnesse of the noyse, whether by a Thunder-clap, or by the falling of a River, the sight by looking upon the Sun, upon fire, or anything that hath a glistering brightnesse.

Answ.

I omit that in most of these, it is not the sense it selfe, but the outward instrument of sence that is offended, & hurt: But let us here see whether ther be the like in the soule, or no; nay the contrary, the more of understanding, and excellency the thing is, the more doth it, comfort and refresh the mind, if it be darke so that we understand it by halves, it hurteth us not; yet it doth not delight us; nay, as we increase in understanding it, so it liketh us the better; and the higher it is, the more doth it stir up the power of our understanding; and (as

you would ſay reach us the hand, to draw us to the attainment thereof; as for them that are dim-ſighted, we forbid them to looke upon the things that are over-bright; but for them of raweſt capacity, wee offer them the things that are moſt intelligible; when the ſence beginneth to perceive moſt ſharpely, then is it faine to give over; as if it felt the very death of it ſelfe, contrary wiſe, where the mind beginneth to underſtand, then is it moſt deſirous to hold on ſtill; and whence ariſeth this, but that our ſences worke by bodily Inſtruments, our mind worketh by a bodileſſe ſubſtance, which needeth not the helpe of the body; and ſeeing that the nature, the nouriſhment, and the actions of the ſoule are farre different, not only from the nature, nouriſhment and actions of the body, but alſo from all that either is done, or wrought by the body: can there be any thing more childiſh, then for us to demee our ſoules to be mortall, by the abating and decaying of our ſences, or by the mortality of our bodies? nay, contrariwiſe, it may be moſt ſoundly, and ſubſtantially concluded thereupon, that mans ſoule is of its owne immortall; ſeeing that all death as well violent, as naturall, commeth of the body, and by the body.

3 Thirdly, the immortality of the ſoule may be firmely proved, even from death it ſelfe: The two beſt definitions of death that eyer I heard of, or read of, are theſe, and both true. 1. Death is a ſeperating of the matter from his forme. 2. Death is the utmoſt period of moving, from both which the immortality of the ſoule may be proved; and firſt of all from the firſt.

Wee have already proved the ſoule to be the forme, and the body muſt needs be the matter then, and the ſeper-

ſeperation of the ſoule from the body, is commonly called death: now then what death can there be of the ſoule, ſeeing it is immateriall, death muſt worke upon a matter, or nothing; for (as one ſaith) a man may take away the roundneſſe, or ſquarneſſe of a table of copper, becauſe they have no abiding, but in the matter, but had that or any thing elſe, ſuch a round, or ſquare forme, as might have abiding without matter, or ſtuffe wherein to be; out of all doubt, ſuch a forme or ſhape ſhould continue for ever; nay, which is more, how can that be the corrupter, of a thing, which is the perfection thereof? the leſſe our minds are tyed to theſe bodily things, the more lively, and cheerfull they be, at a word, the full and perfect life thereof, is the full and perfect with-drawing thereof from the body, and whatſoever the body is made of, and this follow by direct conſequence from the former. All theſe things are ſo clear that they need no proofe; for wee know that every thing worketh according to the proper being thereof, and that ſame which perfecteth the operations of a thing, perfecteth the being thereof alſo; it followeth therefore, that ſeeing the ſeperation of the body from the ſoule, and of the forme from the matter, perfecteth the operation, or working of the ſoule, (as I ſaid before) it doth alſo make perfect, & ſtrengthen the very being thereof; and therefore cannot in any wiſe corrupt it, and what elſe is dying but to bee corrupted? and what elſe is corrupting, but ſuffering? and what elſe is ſuffering, but receiving? and how can that which receiveth all things without ſuffering, receive corruption by any thing? fire corrupteth and marreth our bodies, and we ſuffer in receiving it: ſo alſo doth

extreame.

extreame cold; but if wee suffered nothing by it, it could not freeze us, our sences likewise are marred, by the successive force of the things that they light upon; and that is because they receive, and perceive the thing that grieveth them; and for the manner of their behaving themselves, towards their objects, is subject to suffering; but as the reasonable soul which receiveth al things after one manner, that is by the way of understanding, by which it alway worketh, and is never wrought into; how is it possible for it, to corrupt or marre it selfe.

For what is the thing whereof our Soule suffereth ought in the substance thereof, I meane whereby the substance of our soule is any way impaired or hurt, by minding, or conceiving the same in understanding? as little doth the fire hurt it, as the ayre, and the ayre, as the fire, as little hurt receiveth it, from the frozen Ice of *Groenland*, as from the scorching sands of *Africk*, as little also, doth vice annoy it as vertue; for vice and vertue are so farre off from incumbring the substance of the soule, that our mind doth never conceive, or understand them better, then by setting together one against the other, that thing therefore, which doth no whit impaire it selfe, but taketh the ground of perfecting it selfe by all things, cannot be marred or hurt by any thing.

In the Second place, I said, death is the uttermost poynt of moving, and the uttermost poynt of this life, for even in living we dye, & in dying we live, & there is not that step that we make in this life, but wee step forward unto death, after the manner of a diall or a clocke which endeth its moving, in moving from

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minut to minut, take away moving from a bod, & it liveth no longer; now let us see if the soule also, be caryed with the same moving, if it be, it may dy with the body, if not it cannot, but we see it moves not with the body, nay we see the contrary, a man may have his mind as free as an Emperour, though his body be in prison, whether the mind rest, or whether it be busied, bout the proper operations thereof, it is not perceived, either by the panting of the hart, or by the beating of the pulses, or by the breathing of the lunges, the body carries the soule about like a ship, the sticking fast therof, or the tying of it to a post, hinders not our going up and down in it still.

Fourthly, if the soule be subject to the finall corruption of the body, it must needs be subject to the alteration therof also, and if it be subject to alterations it is subject to time also, for alterations or change are consequents of moving, and moving is not made without time, now time past in respect of the body cannot be called againe, but in respect of the mind it is alwaies present, yea and time perfecteth accomplisheth and encreaseth our mind, and refresheth it from day to day, whereas contrary wise it sorely weareth, wasteth away, and quit consumeth the body. It follws then that the soule is not subject to those changes and corruption, that alter the body, therefore cannot dy with it. 4

Fifth. It appears that the soul is immortal & incorruptible, because it lives by incorruptible things, nothing in the world is nourished by things better then it selfe, neither doth any of them containe greater things then it selfe, but the things that are corruptible doe live of corruptible things, and cannot live without corrupting them 5

them, as for example, beasts live by herbs, men by beasts, both by corrupting them turne them to nourishment, of their nature, and therefore things that live by incorruptible things, and can so disgist them as to turne them into the nourishment of their nature, & yet not corrupt them, are incorruptible themselves too. Now the reasonable soule or mind of man, conceiveth reason and truth, and is fed, and strengthened with them, and reason and truth, are things unchangable, not subiect to time place or alteration, or any thing else that may or can breed corruption, but are stedy, unchangable and everlasting, for that twice two is fowr, that there is the same reason in the proportion, of eight to six, that there is from four to three, or that in a triangle, the three inner angles are equall to the two right angles, and truthes that neither years nor thousands of yeares can chang, as true at this day as they were when *Euclid* first spake them, as true in our schooles as in his, it followeth then that the Soule comprehending reason and trueth, which are things free from coruption, cannot it selfe in any wise, be subiect to corruption.

6 And in the sixt and last place, we might fitly bring in such an argument, as we did in the first *Chap. viz.* if all that is in us were mortall and transitory, we should never question what immortality is, for of contraryes the skill is all one, if a man had no actuall life or had it only by promise, (were it only a mortall life) hee could not dispute of it, till he had it actually, neither by the same argument, could he speake of immortallity, were he not immortall, but of this more before, therefore I Passe it heer.

CHAP. 4.

CHAP. 4.

Obiections against the Souls immortality answered.

AND first for the objection and argument of *R.D.* whom I supposse to be an ingenious man, I desie him, to looke into him selfe, take a litle notice, of the dementions and parts therof, let him tell me the reason of the continuall motion of the heart, the breathing of the lungues, & not the effects of it, but the motive cause of it, if he cannot, then let him confesse he hath something in himselfe, which farre transcends himselfe, and the weakneſse of his capacity, which out of ignorance hee reasons against, though he know not what it is, & therefore I reject all his arguments, *ob Ignorantiam Elenchi*, and passe to other things objected to me.

Saith one, the soule dieth with the body because the soule and body are both one, and why thinkes he so because he sees no more then the body. *Obiect.*

I answare, this argument is all one with theres that denied there was a God, because they saw him not; but yet by his works thou maist perceive there is a God, discerne also by the doings of thy soule, that thou hast a soul, for in a dead body thou seest the same parts remaine but thou seest not the same workes that werein it before, when a man is dead his eye seeth nothing at all, yet there is nothing changed in his eye, but whil he is alive he seeth infinite things that are diverse, the Powre then that seeth is not of the body, how lively and quick sighted soever the eye be, it seeth not it selfe; wonder not then though thou have a soule and yet thy soule seeth not it *Answ.*

selfe, for if thy eye sight saw it selfe, it were not a power or abillity of seeing, but a visible thing, likewise if thy soule saw it selfe it were no more a soule, that is the worker in, and quickner of the body, but a very body unable to do any thing it selfe, a massy substance, subject to suffering, for wee can see nothing but bodies, & bodily substances, because the organ of our sight is corporal; but seeing thou conceivest so many divercities of bodies at once in thy imagination, needs must thou have a Power in thee which is not a body.

Object. But be it (say some) that we have a Power of sence, yet have we not a power of reason, for that we call the power of reason or understanding, is nothing but an excellency or rather a consequence of sence, in so much that when sence dieth, the residue dieth with it.

Answ. 1 In this very objection, thou hast surmounted sence, which thou couldest not have done, if thou hadst had nothing in thee but sence, or nothing far beyound sence, for wheras thou saist, if the sence dye, the rest dieth also, it is a reason that proceedeth from one terme to another, and it is a gathering of reasons which conclude one thing by another; now the sences doe indeed perceive their objects, but yet how lively soever they be they reason not; we see a smoke, so far extendeth the sence, but if we thence infer, therefore there must needs be a fire, and thereupon seeke who was the kindler thereof, that surmounteth the abillity of sence; we heare musicke, that may a Beast do as well as we, but his hearing of it, is but as a bare sound, whereas we in hearing, regard the harmony, and discerne the cause of the concords and discords which either delight or offend us, the thing that heareth the sound, is the sence, but the thing that judg-

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eth of that which the ſence conceiveth, is another thing, the like may bee ſaid of ſmelling, taſting, and feeling, our ſmelling of ſents, our taſting of ſavours, & our feeling of ſubſtances, is indeed the ſix work of our ſences, but our judgment of the inward vertue of a thing by the outward ſent, or of the wholſomneſſe or unwholſomeneſſe of food by the taſt, or of the hotneſſe or vehemency of a feaver, by feeling the pulſe, yea and our proceeding even unto the very bowels of a man, whither the eye being the quickeſt of all ſences is not able to attaine, ſurely it is the work of a more mighty power then the ſence is, & indeed *R. O.* ſaith true on that, there are Beaſts, which doe heare, ſee, ſmell, taſt and feell, much better and quicker then man doeth, yet none of them confereth the contraries of ſounds, colours, ſents and ſavours; none ſorteth them out, to ſerving one of another or to the ſerving of themſelves; the reaſon is (as God ſaith of the Oſtrich) the Lord have given them no underſtanding, and ar *David* ſaith, the man without underſtanbing, dies like a Beaſt, ſhewing that a Beaſt hath none, but often times, man concludes contrary to his ſences, our eye tells us there are noe ſtares up at noone day, but reaſon tells us there are, or the ends of lines in a long walke, meet in a poynt, whereas reaſon cer tifies us that they run direct upon equall diſtances, one from the other, for want of this diſcretion certaine Elcphants ſaith *vetillio* (though the wiſeſt of all Beaſts) which were paſſing over a long bridge, turned backe, being deceived, and yet they wanted ſight no more then we doe, yet they that lead them were not deceived, their leaders then, had in them another power or vertue beſides their eye ſight, which corrected there ſight, and therefore ought to be of higher eſtimation, in like man-

Iob. 39. 20. Pſal. 49. 20. Reade *Plinies* nat. hiſt.. Elephants

ner is it with the other sences, our hearing tells us that the thunderclap is after the lightening, but reason assureth us that they are both together, for there is a certain power in us, that is able to discerne, what proportion is between hearing & seeing, also the tast of one troubled with a disease of choller, beareth him in hand that even sugar it selfe is bitter, which notwithstanding he knoweth by reason to be untrue. To be short, those that have their sences most quicke and lively, be not of the greatest wisdom, and understanding, a man then differeth from a beast, and excelleth them by some other power then sence, a man rideth a great way to learne experience, the man perhaps comes home the wiser, but his horse which perhaps saw as much as he, comes home just as he went out.

Now you see then, there is a great difference betweene the sence and the power that governeth the sence; like as the report of a Spy is one thing, and the Spy himselfe another, and the wisedome of the Captaine which receiveth the report, and judgeth of it, is a third: nay, who can deny, but sence and reason are divers things, or rather, who will not grant, that in many things they are cleane contrary? Sence bid deny, shun, and eschew griefe: whereas reason biddeth sometimes, proffer our legge to the Chyrurgion to be cut off. He that should see *Scevola*, or Archbishop, *Cranmer* of late times, burne off their owne hands without once gnashing their teeth, would hee not thinke they were utterly void of sence, so mightily doth reason over-rule sence. To be short, sence hath his peculiar inclination, which is appetite, and reason likewise hath his, which is will, and like as reason doth often

oftentimes over-rule ſence, and is contrary to it, ſo will correcteth the apetite, or luſt that is in us, & warrath againſt it for in Agues and feavers wee covet to drink, in Apoplexies, and Bethargies to ſleepe, and in hunger to eate, yet from all theſe things doth our will reſtraine us: the more a man follows his luſt, the leſſe is he led by his will (for no man wils to be miſerable, which luſt leads him too) & the more he ſtandeth upon pleaſing of his ſences, the leſſe reaſon ordinarily uſeth he.

Secondly, let us conſider that bruit beaſts which 2
have this ſenſitive part as well as we, if wee have no more then that, how comes it to paſſe, that a little child driveth whole flocks and herds of them, vvhether hee liſteth, & ſometimes whether they would not? wherof commeth it, that many of them in their kind, doe all live, neſtle, and ſing after one ſort: whereas men have their Laws, Common-wealths, manners of buildings, and formes of reaſoning, not only divers, but alſo commonly contrary? now what can harbour theſe contrarieties together, but only that which hath not any thing contrary to it: and wherein all things doe lay away their contrariety? Surely, it is not the ſence can doe it, whoſe proper and peculiar object is moſt contrary to ſence. Beſide this (as I ſaid before) whereas we conceive wiſedome, skill and vertue, and ſuch other things, as are all bodileſſe: our ſences can worke upon nothing, but the qualities of bodily ſubſtances: and whereas wee make univerſall rules of particular things, the ſences attaine no further, then the particular things themſelves: and whereas wee conclude of the cauſes by the effects, our ſences perceive nothing

nothing but the bare effects, so that hee that denieth, that besides the common sence, there is a reason, or understanding in Man, distinct and severed from sence, is void both of understanding and sence.

Object. Yea, but this reason (say they) or power of understanding, which is in Man, is corruptible as well as the power of perceiving by the sences. I thinke I have proved the contrary already: nevertheles let us examin the reason a little further. The forme or shape of every thing (say they) doth perish with the matter: Now the soule is, (as they would say) the forme or shape of the body; therefore it corrupteth with the body. This Argument were rightly concluded, if the soule were a materiall forme, but I have proved that the soule is immortall, and hath a continuance of it selfe: and indeed the more it is discharged of matter, the more it retaineth his own particular forme, therefore the corrupting of the matter toucheth not the soule at all.

Another saith, if dead mens soules live still, why doe none of them come to tell us so?

Answ. And now he thinketh he hath stumbled upon a very subtle device, Christ answers, *Luke 16. ult.* yet we will see a little the rationality, or rather the irrationality of it, *viz.* of the objection.

What intercourse I pray is there betweene things that have bodies, and things that have none? wee see there is small, or no intercourse betweene some Kingdomes under the Sunne. But we would have God send us soules from Heaven to make us beleeve, as who should say, it stood God greatly in hand to make us beleeve, more then it did us that we should beleeve, in effect, what else is all this, but a desiring that some man might

might returne againe into his Mothers wombe, to encourage young babes againſt the bitter pinches and paines which they abide in the birth, which he would no leſſe abhorre then wee doe death, if he had the knowledge of them.

Obiect. But they will ſtill beare us in hand, that ſeeing the vegetive, and ſenſitive powers be corrupted and periſh, the underſtanding, or reaſonable part muſt needs periſh by the ſame rule: alſo,

Anſw. To this (in a word) I anſwer, this is all one, as if a man ſhould ſay, you told me ſuch a man was a very religious man, a good Fencer, and a good Muſician, but now he hath loſt his right hand, he can neither handle ſword nor lute: how then can hee be a religious man ſtill, as you reported him to be? nay, though he looſe Inſtruments, yet ceaſeth he not to be an honeſt man, yea and a Fencer, and Lute-player too in reſpect of skill; likewiſe, when our ſoules have forgone theſe exerciſes, yet ceaſe they not to be the ſame they were before. To make this a little cleare yet, of the powers of the ſoule, ſome are exerciſed by the inſtruments of the body, & otherſome, without any helpe or furtherance of the body at all. Theſe which are exerciſed by the body, are the ſences, and powers of the ſences, and the powers of the growing, which may carry the ſame like anſwer, that is betweene a Muſician, and his Lute. Breake his Lute, his cunning remaineth, but his putting it in practice faileth; give him another Lute, and he fals to playing againe afreſh. Give unto the oldeſt Hag in the world, the ſame eyes he had when he was young, he ſhall ſee as well as ever he did: after the ſame manner it is with the growing and thriving

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ving power, the vegative power in man, restore to it a good stomack, a sound Liver, and a perfect heart: it shall execute its function, as well as ever it did before.

The power which worketh of it selfe without the body, is the power of reason and understanding, which if wee will, wee may call the mind, but if you still doubt thereof, consider when thou mindest a thing earnestly, what thy body furtherech thy mind therein? and thou shalt perceive, that the more fixedly thou thinkest upon it, the lesse thou mindest the things before thee, in so much, that many times, the earnestnesse of his thoughts drives a man (that is going) out of his way, as who should say, that the workings of the body are the greatest impediments that can be, to the peculiar acts of the mind: nay, which is more, this understanding part, groweth so much the stronger and greater, the lesse it is occupied & busied about these base and contemptible things, and is altogether drawne home, wholly to it selfe, as is plainly seene in those that want their eyes, whose minds are commonly most apt to understand, and most firme to remember, do we debate of a thing in our selves? neither our bodies nor sences are busied about it, doe wee will the same? as little doe they stir for that too: to understand, and to will, which are the operations of the mind, the soule hath no need of the body, as for working and being, they accompany one another, saith *Aristotle*. Therefore to continue still in being, the soule hath not to doe with the body, nor any need of the body: therefore for the soule to act well, or to be well, it had need be quite freed from the body.

Object. But (say they) wee see men forgoe their reason as fooles

ſooles and melancholly perſons, and ſeeing it is forgone, it may alſo be corrupted, and if corrupted, it may alſo die, for what is death, bnt an utter and full corruption?

Nay, thou ſhouldſt ſay rather, I have ſeen divers, who have ſeemed to have loſt their right wits, have recovered them againe by good diet and medicinable drinks, but had they beene utterly loſt and gone; no phyſick could have reſtored them againe; therefore of neceſſity the ſoule was as ſound as before: it was but like an eclypſe of the Sunne, it ſeems be dimmed; but it is but by the comming of the Moone betweene him and us, in his light there is no abatement at all, but only *quoad nos*, likewiſe our eye conceiveth things according to the ſpectacles through which it looketh upon them: take away the Moon or clouds and the Sun ſhineth cleare: take away the impediments, the eye ſeeth clear, purge away the humours, our imaginations ſhall be pure, and our underſtanding as bright as ever, it fareth not with our ſoules, as it doth with our bodies, which after a long ſickneſſe retaine ſtill, either a hardneſſe of the ſpleene, or a ſhortneſſe of the breath, weakneſſe of body, or a falling downe of Rheume upon the lungs; nor as a wound that retaineth a ſcarre which cannot be worne out, for neither in their underſtanding, nor in their wils doe our ſoules feele any abatement: and this appeareth in lunatick folks, and others, who have their wits troubled at times, and by fits, for they be not vexed but at the ſtirring of their humour, being at other times ſober and well enough ſtaid in their wits: the like is ſeen in them that

have the falling ſickneſſe, their underſtanding ſeemes only to be ecclipſed, during the time of their fits, but afterward they be as diſcreet as though they ayled nothing, you ſhall never ſee any body out of his wits, in whom the Phyſician may not manifeſtly perceive, either ſome default of the inſtruments, or ſome overflowing of ſome melancholly humour, that troubled and marred his body, before it troubled or impaired his mind. To be ſhort, whoſoever ſaith, that mans ſoul periſheth with the body, becauſe it is troubled by the diſtemperature, or indiſpoſition of the body, may as well uphold and maintaine, that the Child in his mothers wombe dieth with his mother, becauſe he moveth with her, and is partaker with her in her harmes, and throws, by reaſon of the ſtraight conjunction that is between them, and yet we ſee many children have lived ſafe and ſound, notwithſtanding their mothers have died: yea, and ſome of them have come into the world, even by the death of their mothers.

Object. Laſtly, whereas ſome ſay, that our minds cannot conceive any thing here but by the helpe of the imagination: and therfore when the imagination is gone, with the inſtruments whereto it is tyed, the ſoule can not worke, nor conſequently be.

To this I anſwer, that it is all one, as if they ſhould ſay, that becauſe the child being in his mothers womb taketh nouriſhment of her blood, by his navill, therefore he cannot live when he is come out of her womb, and his navill ſtrings cut off, when wee ſee that then is the time that the mouth, and the tongue, and the other parts of the Child doe their dutie, which ſerved before to no purpoſe, ſaving that they were

were prepared for the time to come: even ſo the ſoule being ſcaped out of the body, as a Child out of the wombe, ſhall begin to performe his operations by himſelfe, and that more certainely, for that it ſhall not bee ſubject to falſe reports, neither to the ſences inward or outward, but to the very things themſelves, which it ſhall have ſeene and learned in it ſelfe: To be ſhort, it ſhall live, but not in priſon, it ſhall ſee, but not through ſpectacles; it ſhall underſtand, but not by reports; it ſhall will, but not by the way of luſting: the infirmities which the body caſteth upon it now ſhall then be done away.

Let us conclude then, that our ſoule is an underſtanding, reaſonable power, over which death or corruption have no power: If any man yet doubt thereof, let him but examine himſelfe: for even his owne doubts will prove it to him: If he ſtand in contention ſtill, let him fall to reaſoning with himſelfe, for by concluding his Arguments to prove his ſoule mortall, hee ſhall give judgement himſelfe, that it is immortall. If I have left out any thing that might bee alleaged, (for who is able to alleage all in juſtification of anypoint) let it ſuffice that here is ſufficient for the ſatisfaction of the ingenuous: If any be otherwiſe minded, let him ſee how they can anſwer theſe my aforeſaid Arguments: Conſider what I have writen, and the Lord give you a right underſtanding.

Scriptures to prove the being of the Soule, *after it is ſeperated from the* Body, *and* before the Reſurrection.

I *Am in a ſtrait betwixt two, having a deſire to depart and to be with* Chriſt *which is farre better, neverthelesſe to abide in the fleſh is more needfull for you*, Phil. 1.23.24. heers a being with *Chriſt* after a departure.

And to abide in the fleſh, why is this added, if there were not an abiding out of the fleſh, before the reſurrection.

Math, 10.28. *Feare not them that kill the body but are not able to kill the ſoule but rather feare him that is able to caſt both body and Soule into Hell.*

Heer's a body that may be killed, a ſoule that cannot be killed but to evade thes *R:O*, makes a great puzle to prove noe hell, till the reſurrection, a luſty ſtrong, ſuperlogicall argument, there is noe hell till the reſurrection, *Ergo man* hath noe Immortall ſoule. *Riſum teneatis amici?* might not his Dromodoticall argument be rightly retorted backe heer upon himſelfe?

2. Cor, 5.6.8. *Therefore wee are alwais confident, knowing that whilſt we are at home in the body we are abſent from the* Lord. *we are confident I ſay, and willing rather to be abſent from the body and to be preſent with the* Lord.

The words are ſo plaine they need noe explanation but hold forth the immortallity of the ſoule as cleere as the ſnnne at noone day.

Luk.

Is this the word of God? may a man build his faith upon it? then both Christ and the penitentiall theife were that day in parradice, there bodies were not there then their soules must; unlesse any should say parradice is in the grave, which is as rediculous as false.

Eccles: 12.7. *Then shall dust returne to the earth as it was and the spirit shall return to* God *who gave it.*

A scripture beyond exception, heere is soule & body described by their originall, by their pedegree, the one taken from the earth, to it, it must returne, the other comes from Iehovah and to him it shall returne who is not the God of the dead but of the living.

FINIS.